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Can nature lie? This question weighed upon the parson-
naturalist Charles Kingsley in 1857 as he read with horror a 
new book by his friend Philip Henry Gosse. Omphalos argued 
that the Earth’s record of changing species was an illusion 
caused by fossils and strata appearing readymade in the 
beginning. “Each organism,” Gosse wrote, “was from the first 
marked with the records of a previous being. But since 
creation and previous history are inconsistent with each other 
. . . it follows, that such records are false” (336). Kingsley 
had earlier praised and emulated Gosse’s work, which framed 
nature studies as a form of religious worship. Omphalos, 
however, dismayed Kingsley. “For twenty-five years,” he wrote,  
 
I have read no book which has so staggered and puzzled 
me. . . . Your book tends to prove this--that if we 
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accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes a Deus 
quidam deceptor. . . . [Y]ou make God tell a lie. It is 
not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here; 
which makes me say, “Come what will, disbelieve what I 
may, I cannot believe this of a God of truth, of Him who 
is Light and no darkness at all, of Him who formed the 
intellectual man after His own image, that he might 
understand and glory in His Father’s works.” . . . I 
cannot . . . believe that God has written on the rocks 
one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind (280-
81).  
 
Kingsley’s protest reflected his view that nature was true in 
an empirical sense, following fixed, observable laws; and also 
in a moral sense, sincerely conveying God’s values and 
teaching humans to be equally sincere. At stake for Kingsley 
in this argument was humankind’s relationship with a personal 
God. As a member of the Broad Church movement seeking to avoid 
doctrinal factionalism, he emphasized God’s moral character, 
which worshippers came to know through both scripture and the 
world. Believing every text or creation carried traces of its 
maker, Kingsley concluded nature must, like the Bible, embody 
divine virtues, the highest of which for him was truthfulness.  
 Kingsley’s insistence that nature testified to God’s 
love of truth reflected his idiosyncratic obsession with 
truthfulness. Yet it was also symptomatic of wider 
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interactional dynamics between Victorian science and religion. 
Kingsley is often name-checked in refutation of simplistic 
models of science and religion, or science and the humanities, 
as separate, irreconcilable bodies of thought. Supporting 
Charles Darwin’s theories of evolution and preaching the value 
of science in alliance with secularists such as Thomas Henry 
Huxley, Kingsley seems to exemplify the potential for 
collaboration between science and religion, and science and 
the humanities (the supposed “two cultures”).1 However, Anne 
DeWitt has recently cautioned against rhetoric of “one 
culture,” claiming it downplays the complex struggles for 
authority between different groups and methods.
2
 Kingsley’s 
insistence on nature’s divine truthfulness illustrates how 
common ground could also be disputed territory. This argument, 
which he developed through the course of his career, sought to 
protect the Church’s interpretive authority over nature from 
being usurped or invalidated by secular science. From the mid-
century onwards, as physical nature, and theology and ethics 
increasingly diverged into separate kinds of knowledge, 
Kingsley’s rhetoric of unitary truth struggled to hold them 
together. For Kingsley, the facts of life had to embody moral 
truths equally as the Bible’s moral teachings had to be 
grounded in facts, however qualified and uncertain this 
morality and factuality might be. Such natural theology 
interlocked with a nationalist ideology of British honesty and 
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moderation, which Kingsley imagined as embodied in his liberal 
Anglicanism. 
 Kingsley’s model of nature as a paragon and preacher of 
veracity was undermined, however, by growing evidence that 
many species survived by parasitism and ruthless deception. 
Jacques Derrida noted a long-running tendency in western 
philosophy to construct lying as one of the fundamental 
barriers between humans and animals (129-36). However, 
Kingsley was concerned less with animals’ mental capacities 
than with their symbolic function. Why would a truth-loving 
God create animal camouflage and disguises? John Hawley argues 
that while Kingsley always publically insisted on nature’s 
divine legibility, privately, in his later years, he 
“increasingly turned to the ‘book’ of nature as one might view 
a Rorschach blot: as a suggestive invitation to discern 
meaning” (479). Nonetheless, Kingsley never gave up the search 
for moral meaning in nature, since its presumed existence was 
fundamental to his authority as a parson-naturalist, devoted 
to interpreting nature and scripture side by side. He 
sometimes downplayed nature’s deceits by moralizing the 
practices of science, imagined as a providential expression of 
divine truthfulness. However, this strategy framed nature per 
se as contrastingly amoral. After Kingsley’s death, scientific 
naturalists would follow this point to its conclusion, 
representing ethics not as natural or transcendent but as 
artificial and, perhaps, relative. Resisting these 
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implications, Kingsley inconsistently clung onto the idea of 
innate moral symbolism in nature, however cryptic. In his 
vision, moral truth vacillated between being an objective 
natural fact and a human projection. 
 
Natural Truthfulness 
 
Kingsley’s belief in nature’s truthfulness followed from 
his fixation with sincerity. Protestant tradition had 
idealized sincerity as a virtue which collapsed the 
distinction between inner conscience and outward speech.
3
 To be 
true, in the sincere sense, was to be not merely honorable, 
reliable or correct, but also to be transparent. Kingsley 
often failed to embody this ideal, hiding his private 
spiritual struggles behind a bullish public voice. Yet the 
ideal remained central to his thought. As an upper-class, 
Cambridge-educated rector, he sacrificed promotion to speak 
out in favour of controversial causes such as Christian 
Socialism. “I will not be a liar,” he wrote to his wife Fanny 
in 1848 when encouraged to distance himself from the movement: 
“I will speak in season and out of season. I will not shun to 
declare the whole counsel of God” (1:178). In 1856, he wrote 
to Gosse of his loathing for Catholicism’s “outward 
observances, and mere stage-acting in the house of God” 
(1:413). His public dispute with John Henry Newman in the 
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1860s stemmed from Kingsley’s contention that the Catholic 
author had encouraged priests to lie. His reverence for truth 
sometimes even made him regret writing fiction, deriding the 
activity as “a farce and a sham.”4 The novelist was perhaps not 
so different from the animal imposter, clothed in false 
colors. Kingsley imagined God as the origin of veracity, 
exemplifying it to humankind in his words and works. In an 
early lecture “On English Composition” (1848), he claimed that 
God intended language to serve not the concealment but “the 
expression of thought.” All literature expressed “the 
character of the writer’s mind and heart,” Kingsley argued, 
since, “Expression is literally the pressing out into palpable 
form that which is already within us” (230-31). Kingsley would 
transpose this notion of the text as a materialization of its 
author’s mind onto nature. 
A keen naturalist from his youth, Kingsley had grown up 
with the traditional idea that nature was a “book” of moral 
symbols, from the cunning fox to the industrious bee.
5
 William 
Kirby’s Bridgewater Treatise (1835) had reasserted nature’s 
divine textuality, declaring “The Works of God and the Word of 
God may be called the two doors which open into the temple of 
Truth . . . as both proceed from the same Almighty and 
Omniscient Author” (1:xvii). In 1842, as a young curate, 
Kingsley echoed this rhetoric in a letter to his future wife 
Fanny: “Do not study matter for its own sake, but as the 
countenance of God! . . . Study the sky! Study water! Study 
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trees! . . . Study all these . . . as allegories and examples 
from whence moral reflections may be drawn” (1:88). From his 
earliest sermons, Kingsley described nature as God’s sincere 
self-expression. “I can trust God’s world to bear better 
witness than I can, of the Loving Father who made it,” he told 
his parishioners in 1846: “I thank him from my own experience 
for the testimony of His Creation, only next to the testimony 
of His Bible” (“Natural History” 304). Nature not only 
preached truth, in Kingsley’s formulation, but also 
exemplified it. His idealizations cohere with a philosophical 
tradition which Anthony Pilkington has traced back to the Earl 
of Shaftesbury and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, framing nature as 
transparently truthful in contrast to human mendacity (61-62). 
Nor was Kingsley alone among mid-Victorians in continuing this 
tradition. The preacher George Dawson, whom Kingsley dubbed 
“the greatest talker in England” (qtd. in Dale 90), argued 
that nature’s products offered a moral exemplum through their 
transparency: 
I look at Nature, then, and it becomes to me a preacher. 
I watch all its details and I find written upon every 
one--truthfulness. . . . The body tells of the soul and 
the soul of the body . . . [E]very form is made up of 
particles, each of which bears the true form of the 
whole. . . . There is no show, no “appearance,” no 
“getting up,” as there is in many of our lives. . . . 
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Nature never does lie. It is only man that lies; and in 
proportion as man lies, he departs from Nature (414, 419-
23). 
Animal bodies might be imagined as similarly transparent, as 
Kingsley’s friend John Ruskin showed when contrasting them 
with “deceptive” modern architecture. “That building will 
generally be the noblest,” he wrote, “which to an intelligent 
eye discovers the great secrets of its structure, as an animal 
form does, although from a careless observer they may be 
concealed” (80). Nature seemed to parallel the Bible as the 
source and standard of truthfulness. 
However, such rhetoric masked long-growing uncertainty of 
nature’s capacity to convey moral truths. While science had 
discovered natural laws that were empirically verifiable, 
their possible symbolic meanings were, like those of the 
Bible, open to interpretation. Deism had shown how ambiguous 
nature could be when read independently of scripture. Thomas 
Paine implied nature favored republican democracy and rejected 
artificial aristocracy (21). Conversely, David Hume noted 
that, if nature did proclaim a creator, its gratuitous 
violence and suffering hardly suggested a moral one (133-34). 
Such dangerous deism and scepticism caused evangelicals to 
stress the primacy of scripture and the moral inscrutability 
of nature.
7
 These problems had prompted the influential natural 
theologian William Paley to emphasize practical evidence of 
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design over less certain moral symbolism. Paley concluded that 
nature testified to a creator through its ingenious 
adaptations, which maximized happiness. Kingsley was immersed 
in Paley’s work as an undergraduate and described him, in 
later years, as one of the “greatest natural theologians” 
(“Future” 315). However, Paley’s utilitarian effort to 
calculate the world’s goodness undermined the claim that it 
taught goodness. As naturalists followed Paley’s lead, 
studying organisms’ adaptions to their environments, examples 
multiplied of creatures surviving through not superior 
strength or skills but deceptive camouflage and parasitism.
5
 
Gosse commented: “A very vast amount of the energy of animal 
life is spent either in making war, or in resisting or evading 
it. . . . [V]arious are the arts and devices, the tricks and 
stratagems . . . employed in that earnest strife which never 
knows a suspension of hostilities” (Evenings 407). As evidence 
mounted for species extinction, nature seemed not only to 
reward deceit but to consign the honest to oblivion. These 
influences suffused mid-century English nature writing with a 
profound ambivalence about the moral significance of its 
objects. Scholars have debated the gradual shift in nature 
writing of this time from a “narrative of natural theology” to 
a “narrative of natural history,” which avoided theological 
questions.
8
 If Nature spoke, it perhaps spoke only of its own 
internal workings. 
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Kingsley would downplay this designification of nature by 
moralizing and spiritualizing the practices of science, 
framing them as providential developments that showed God’s 
love of truth. This logic resembled the Cambridge geologist 
Adam Sedgwick’s claim in his Discourse on the Studies of the 
University (1833) that, despite seeming to undermine 
scripture, science actually confirmed it. Inductive research, 
he argued, embodied the Christian values of humility, patience 
and self-abnegation in the search for truth.
9
 In his book of 
seaside studies Glaucus: Wonders of the Shore (1854-5), 
Kingsley praised Sedgwick for having thus “wielded in defence 
of Christianity the very science . . . expected to subvert it” 
(14). However, this moralizing and spiritualizing of 
scientific habits rendered the textuality of nature uncertain. 
In 1845, Sedgwick argued that nature’s consistent laws 
embodied the divine virtue of truthfulness, since moral and 
material “nature” came from “one creative mind” (56). Yet 
Sedgwick also stressed the separateness of the moral and 
material. Fearing evolutionary theory would reduce morality to 
an outgrowth of the physical, he argued that the human 
intellect “ennobled” material nature, projecting moral 
analogies onto matter that remained, in itself, amoral (56). 
Although Kingsley would disagree with Sedgwick on evolution, 
he echoed the geologist’s ambivalence about the moral 
legibility of nature. In Glaucus and his evolutionary fairy 
tale The Water Babies (1862-63), he presented science and 
Will Abberley 11 
 
technology as providential realizations of divine 
truthfulness, which humankind imposed upon nature rather than 
discovering it there. However, these texts also clung onto the 
notion that nature possessed some moral significance in 
itself, preaching honesty, diligence and cooperation, and 
condemning liars and parasites through physical degeneration. 
Later in his career, Kingsley seemed, superficially, to accept 
the division of moral and material truth, distinguishing 
science and theology by their respective concerns for “the 
How” and “the Why.” Yet this division also served to maintain 
the overlap between material and moral, presenting them as 
opposite ends of a spectrum instead of fundamentally separate. 
Kingsley’s insistence that nature had a “Why” protected the 
authority of parson-naturalists like him to interpret it as a 
text of divine moral symbols. Kingsley often conjured the 
concept of Deus quidam deceptor (God who is sometimes a 
deceiver) in order to forcefully deny it. Yet his real 
struggle was less against the spectre of a deceitful creator 
than the idea that lying as a moral concept had no saliency in 
nature.   
 
 Unnatural Theology  
 
Kingsley first made his name as a parson-naturalist with 
Glaucus, which he published as an article then expanded into a 
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book. Following controversies around Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species (1859), Kingsley tried to reconcile evolution with 
religion in The Water-Babies, and continued to lecture on 
natural history until his death in 1875. Glaucus reveals his 
first uncertainties about nature’s supposed truthfulness, as 
he observes organisms surviving through tricks and parasitism. 
Hence, the text frequently locates divine truthfulness in the 
habits of naturalists, conceptualizing the world as a kind of 
trial which humans overcome through scientific honesty and 
objectivity. Kingsley imagines this process further in The 
Water-Babies, suggesting that, through science, humans are 
destined not only to transcend nature’s deceits but also to 
remove them, imposing truthfulness on nature. 
 The rhetoric of Glaucus often presents nature as morally 
significant and improving. “How easily a man might, if he 
would, wash his soul clean,” Kingsley writes, “by going out to 
be alone a while with God in heaven, and with that earth which 
He has given to the children of men . . . as a witness and a 
sacrament that in Him they live and move” (221-22). Nature 
seems to reveal its creator just as Kingsley imagined books 
expressing the character of their authors. The beaches and 
rock pools, he writes, display “the finger-mark of God” (16). 
Amy King notes that the popular genre of seaside-study book 
followed the novelistic logic of discovering general truths by 
scrutinizing tiny particulars (159-62). Kingsley frames his 
narrative in this way, instructing the reader “to see grandeur 
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in the minutest objects . . . estimating each thing not 
carnally . . . by its size or its pleasantness to the senses, 
but spiritually, by the amount of Divine thought revealed to 
him therein” (45). Hamlin observes that Kingsley perceived a 
divine moral in crabs tidying the sea floor so, exemplifying 
duty and social responsibility (“Green” 269). “All the 
invaluable laws and methods of sanitary reform,” Kingsley 
writes, “at best are but clumsy imitations of the unseen 
wonders which every animalcule and leaf have been working 
since the world’s foundation; with this slight difference 
between them and us, that they fulfil their appointed task, 
and we do not.” Nature appears a righteous foil to “the 
carelessness, and laziness, and greed of sinful man,” 
preaching morals to humans wise enough to listen. Kingsley 
continues, “The sickly geranium which spreads its blanched 
leaves against the cellar panes . . . had it a voice, could 
tell more truly than ever a doctor in the town, why little 
Bessy sickened of the scarlatina, and little Johnny of the 
hooping-cough” (174-75). The crab’s scavenging offers a 
morality play, as the narrator states: “The evil was there,--
and there it should not stay; so having neither cart nor 
barrow, he just began putting it into his stomach, and in the 
meanwhile set his assistants to work likewise” (179). If 
nature speaks, it is through actions, not words. Nevertheless, 
Kingsley seems to read its messages as clearly as those in the 
Bible. 
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 Such moral symbolism was countered, however, by displays 
of apparent wanton violence and deceit. In 1856, Kingsley 
wrote to his friend F. D. Maurice of his disappointment in 
nature studies:  
 
I have long ago found out how little I can discover about 
God’s absolute love, or absolute righteousness, from a 
universe in which everything is eternally eating 
everything else--infinite cunning and shift (in the good 
sense), infinite creative fancy it does reveal; but 
nothing else, unless interpreted by moral laws which are 
in oneself already, and in which one has often to trust 
against all appearances, and cry out of the lowest deep 
(as I have had to do) . . . Art thou a “Deus quidam 
Deceptor,” after all?--No. there is something in me--
which is not nature, but Thou must have taught me . . . I 
know that my Redeemer . . . will justify me, and make me 
right, and deliver me out of the grasp of nature . . . 
But beetles and zoophytes never whispered that to me. . . 
. [Nature] can teach no moral theology. It may unteach 
it, if the roots of moral theology be not already healthy 
and deep in the mind. I hinted that in “Glaucus” (1:486). 
 
Kingsley’s qualification of the phrase “cunning and shift” 
betrays his anxiety that nature might show creative ingenuity, 
but not a truth-loving God. Glaucus often implies this point 
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by discovering God’s “love” in animals’ adaptations to their 
environments. The whelk “burrows in the sand in chase of 
hapless bivalve shells, whom he bores through with his sharp 
tongue (always, cunning fellow, close to the hinge, where the 
fish is), and then sucks out their life” (75). The whelk’s 
amoral “cunning” testifies merely to its practical adaptation 
to its surroundings. Kingsley similarly avoids moral symbolism 
when discussing the parasitic sea anemone which rides on a 
crab’s back, stealing its food. The only lesson Kingsley draws 
here is that “kind Nature” always provides, fitting the 
anemone “with a stout leather coat” to shield it when the 
blundering crab collides with rocks (76). The rhetoric of 
moral symbolism gives way to literal utility in the struggle 
for survival. 
 Kingsley’s anthropomorphic descriptions of sea life 
paradoxically accentuate nature’s amorality. Depicting prey as 
pitiable victims and predators as devious villains, he 
highlights nature’s injustice as crimes go unpunished. In one 
memorable passage, the reader is encouraged to empathize with 
a fish lethally duped by a camouflaged sea worm. Kingsley’s 
description hovers between the perspectives of naturalist and 
fish as the worm 
 
hangs, helpless and motionless . . . it may be a dead 
strip of sea-weed, Himanthalia lorea, perhaps, or Chorda 
filum; or even a tarred string. So thinks the little fish 
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who plays over and over it, till he touches at last what 
is too surely a head. In an instant a bell-shaped sucker 
mouth has fastened to his side. In another instant, from 
one lip, a concave double proboscis . . . has clasped him 
like a finger; and now begins the struggle: but in vain 
(137). 
The Gothic horror continues as the fish descends into a “cave 
of doom” (the worm’s stomach). The “black murderer” curls up 
to digest its kill, “motionless and blest” (138), the latter 
adjective showing Kingsley’s effort to preserve some sense of 
morality. He retreats to Paley’s view of nature as a system 
that maximizes happiness, unable to read any abstract ethics 
in such phenomena. “This planet was not made for man alone,” 
Kingsley reflects, “and if there were . . . final moral causes 
for their existence, the only ones which we have a right to 
imagine are these--that all, down to the lowest Rhizopod, 
might delight themselves, however dimly, in existing; and that 
the Lord might delight Himself in them” (88-89). Even this 
claim seems overly optimistic, though, in light of nature’s 
cruel tricks and destruction. Kingsley characterizes life 
underwater by 
 
wild flux and confusion, the mad struggles, the 
despairing cries of the world of spirits which man has 
defiled by sin, which would at moments crush the 
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naturalist’s heart, and make his brain swim with terror, 
were it not that he can see by faith, through all the 
abysses and the ages, not merely “Hands, From out the 
darkness, shaping man;” but above them a living loving 
countenance, human and yet Divine (125). 
 
Nature might be empirically “truthful” in so far as its facts 
were consistent. However, as a model or allegory of moral 
truthfulness, it often failed to deliver. 
 Faced with this designification of nature, Kingsley 
salvaged some moral meaning by focusing on the habits of the 
naturalist. God revealed his love of truth, Kingsley sometimes 
suggested, less through nature itself than through the 
providential rise of science, which developed humans’ 
truthfulness. Glaucus depicts the naturalist as above the 
physical world through his bodily self-control. “For his moral 
character,” Kingsley declares, “he must, like a knight of old 
. . . [be] brave and enterprising . . . [free] from haste and 
laziness, from melancholy, testiness, pride, and all the 
passions which make men see only what they wish to see” (44-
45). Kingsley conflates science’s search for factual truths 
with Christian self-abnegation: both involve transcending the 
mortal body, subjective feelings and animal urges. His 
sentiments conform to a broad, emerging linkage in the period 
between objectivity and Christian rejection of bodily self.
8
 In 
1854, John Tyndall claimed the scientific practitioner’s 
Will Abberley 18 
 
transcendence of personal feelings and bias rendered him “a 
heroic, if not indeed an angelic, character” (344). At the 
same time, phrenology (which greatly interested Kingsley) 
framed moral improvement as a movement away from “animal” 
tendencies. As the phrenologist George Combe wrote, “Man has 
received animal propensities and moral sentiments,” the latter 
separating him from animals (364). Like muscles, morals could 
be imagined as strengthening with use, and Kingsley frequently 
advocated science as an exercise to this end. He wrote that 
the naturalist’s habits “of general patience, diligence, 
accuracy, reverence for facts for their own sake . . . are not 
merely intellectual, but also moral habits, which will stand 
men in practical good stead in every affair of life” 
(“Soldiers” 186). While nature might often be deceitful, 
studying it formed part of humankind’s elevation towards godly 
truthfulness. 
Kingsley frames aesthetically and morally revolting 
phenomena as moral trials that help naturalists to transcend 
their bodily subjectivity. The shore’s “mass of life,” he 
writes, “is somewhat ugly, perhaps, at first sight,” strewn 
with “huge dirty bivalve shells, as large as the hand, each 
with its loathly grey and black siphons hanging out, a 
confused mass of slimy death” (62). The naturalist must learn 
to bear such unpleasantness, however, to appreciate the more 
abstract beauty of nature’s system. In this sense, Kingsley 
equivocates over whether nature is truly amoral or merely 
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seems so due to humans’ fallen state. Camouflage is perhaps an 
invitation to scrutiny, as Kingsley states of the sea worm:  
there are animals in which results so strange, fantastic, 
even seemingly horrible, are produced, that fallen man 
may be pardoned, if he shrinks from them in disgust. 
That, at least, must be a consequence of our own wrong 
state; for everything is beautiful and perfect in its 
place. . . . Whether we are intruding or not in turning 
this stone, we must pay a fine for having done so, for 
there lies an animal as foul and monstrous to the eye as 
“hydra, gorgon, or chimera dire,” and yet so wondrously 
fitted to its work that we must needs endure, for our own 
instruction, to handle and to look at it (136). 
It is not nature that Kingsley describes as “fallen” but 
humans, whose mortal state distorts their view. Glaucus echoes 
the sentiment of the Proverbs which offered early Victorians a 
useful explanation for nature’s visual tricks: “It is the 
glory of God to conceal a thing: but the honour of kings is to 
search out a matter”.11 Fallen humans might be said to occupy a 
world of unreliable appearances, but to develop the divine 
truthfulness in themselves by seeking beneath these 
appearances. This redemptive, internal process diverts 
attention from the brutal function of such tricks in nature’s 
economy. 
Will Abberley 20 
 
Glaucus’s rambling narrative form reinforces the focus on 
the naturalist-narrator scrutinizing his perceptions, and, in 
the process, abstracting from nature, viewing it from a 
higher, more spiritual altitude. As in Gosse’s popular books, 
the narrative begins not with systematic taxonomies but 
subjective impressions, which the truth-seeker must carefully 
filter and interrogate. Approaching a bed of shells washed up 
on the beach, the narrator exclaims:  
What a variety of forms and colours are there, amid the 
purple and olive wreaths of wrack. What are they all? 
What are the long white razors? . . . What the tufts of 
delicate yellow plants like squirrels’ tails, and 
lobsters’ horns[?] . . . What those tiny babies’ heads, 
covered with grey prickles instead of hair? . . . [W]hat 
are the red capsicums? and why are they . . . rattling 
about the huge mahogany cockles, as big as a child’s two 
fists, out of which they are protruded? (63-64) 
Structuring his description as a series of questions and 
visual metaphors, Kingsley foregrounds problems of perception 
and perspective. These creatures are, of course, neither 
razors, squirrels’ tails, nor human body parts; but our minds 
process these unfamiliar objects through comparisons, which 
can mislead. Kingsley urges his readers to gather corallines 
on the beach, “and think long over them before you determine 
whether the oat-like stems and spongy roots belong to an 
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animal, or a vegetable. Animals they are, nevertheless, though 
even now you will hardly guess the fact, when you see at the 
mouth of each tube a little scarlet flower” (169). Through 
Kingsley’s narration, the reader vicariously experiences the 
confusion of the naturalist duped by one organism’s 
resemblance to another. He asks: “What is that little brown 
thing whom you have just taken off the rock to which it 
adhered so stoutly by his sucking-foot? A limpet? Not at all: 
he is of quite a different family and structure.” The sea-
snail serves as an object lesson, Kingsley explains, “of the 
way in which a scientific knowledge of objects must not obey, 
but run counter to, the impressions of sense” (128-29). 
Although nature’s deceptions would seem to render it morally 
meaningless, Kingsley rationalizes them as spurs to humans’ 
innate will to truth, inviting us to dispel the tricks and 
confusions with science. While animals might deceive each 
other, God seems to express his love of truth through the 
providential rise of science, which raises humans above such 
deceit.  
Kingsley extends this moralization of science further in 
The Water-Babies, suggesting that humans are destined to 
remodel nature, rendering it more truthful. Mastering nature 
technologically, humans are able to remove or ameliorate its 
cruel deceits. Nature comes to resemble a physical and moral 
work-in-progress which God intends humans to perfect. Further, 
in the process of this work, they perfect their own inner 
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natures. The protagonist Tom begins life as a devious, 
blackened chimneysweep, but eventually develops into an honest 
“great man of science” who “can plan railroads, and steam-
engines, and electric telegraphs, and rifled guns” (260). Tom 
realizes this destiny after he is transformed into a magical 
“water baby” that repairs marine environments and safeguards 
their inhabitants. Victorian aquarium-keepers were often 
depicted as moral managers, preventing fights between sea 
creatures and obviating predation by feeding them.
12
 Tom acts 
similarly, protecting prey and foiling predators’ deadly 
deceptions. He warns salmon of a “wicked otter” lying in wait 
for them, and tries to protect them from poachers who lure the 
fish to the surface with bright lights (140). Kingsley was no 
vegetarian and accepted the necessity of predation in nature’s 
economy, but his vision suggests predation might at least be 
made more honest, much as fox-hunters justified their blood 
sport as a fair contest between noble opponents (Griffin 144-
46). Kingsley implies that humans are destined to domesticate 
nature into a cleaner, more transparent form, emphasized by 
persistent imagery of purification. The tale’s claim that, 
“people’s souls make their bodies,” and not vice-versa, 
presents virtues as supernatural, elevating them above brute 
nature (171). Divine truthfulness seems to be located not in 
material nature but in humans’ efforts to rise above and 
improve it.  
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The discourse of natural amorality was intensified by 
Darwin’s observations of insects evolving to blend in with 
their habitats, becoming imperceptible to prey and predators 
(Origin 84). At the same time, Henry Walter Bates’ theory of 
protective mimicry argued that many insects evolved to trick 
their enemies by resembling other, inedible species. In April 
1863, a month after Macmillan’s Magazine published the last 
instalment of The Water Babies, Kingsley praised Bates’ 
“Mocking butterflies” as evidence of God’s design. Kingsley 
told Bates that such mimicry “looks most like an immensely 
long chapter of accidents, and is really, if true, a chapter 
of special Providences of Him without whom not a sparrow falls 
to the ground” (2:173-75). Yet Kingsley’s utilitarian rhetoric 
of design elided the damage such mimicry did to the 
credibility of natural moral symbolism. As Darwin observed, 
“Nature condescended to the tricks of the stage” 
(“Contributions” 220-21). Truthfulness would seem to have no 
meaning in the beasts’ struggle for life. 
 
Amoral Facts and Moral Laws 
 
 Locating divine truth in the study of nature instead of 
its phenomena was problematic for Kingsley’s natural theology, 
as it tended to separate factual truth from moral truth. Such 
a separation would split science and ethics (along with 
religion) into what Stephen Jay Gould called “non-overlapping 
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magisteria,” exemplified in Huxley and Tyndall’s agnosticism. 
As Baden Powell wrote in 1860, science answered to “matters of 
external fact” and religion to matters “internal, moral, and 
spiritual.” Theologians and men of science confused questions 
of “right or wrong” with “truth or error,” Powell concluded, 
through being “forgetful of their own professions” (97, 100). 
His comments reflected the growing divergence of clergyman and 
man of science into separate professional identities produced 
and trained by different institutions.
13
 Kingsley’s 
interpretive authority was also challenged by secular 
evolutionary ethics, which, like deism before it, claimed to 
find moral laws in nature which replaced those of the Bible. 
For these reasons, Kingsley continued to seek moral-religious 
symbolism in nature per se as well as indirectly through 
science’s mastery of nature. His letter to Bates shows him 
defending his authority as a natural theologian to interpret 
nature, alongside the secular naturalist’s empirical studies. 
Having proposed an alternative mechanism of insect mimicry, 
Kingsley yielded to Bates’ rebuttal, stating: ‘I honestly bow 
to your superior knowledge’. However, Kingsley was also quick 
to circumscribe this knowledge, explaining:  
 
I have been trying to bring my little logic and 
metaphysic to bear--not on physical science herself, for 
she stands on her own ground, microscope in hand, and 
will allow no intruder, however venerable; but on the 
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nomenclature of physical science, which is to me 
painfully confused, from a want in our scientific men of 
that logical training by which things are rightly named, 
though they cannot be discovered thereby (2:174). 
 
Kingsley argues that, although physical science discovers 
“laws” of nature, these laws are external to its material 
facts, “the result of a strictly immaterial and spiritual 
agency” (2:175). While men of science rule over the facts that 
make up nature’s laws, Kingsley implies theologians have the 
authority to interpret these laws, discovering meanings in 
them as in a text. Kingsley would build on this claim from The 
Water Babies onwards, arguing for traces of moral symbolism 
(particularly promoting truthfulness) in nature’s abstract 
laws. 
 Kingsley frequently staked his claim for natural moral 
symbolism in the supposed laws of degeneration. Equating 
degeneration with immorality, he depicted dishonest behavior 
as correlative to a low, degraded physical state.
14
 The Water-
Babies portrays this dynamic through Tom’s physical evolution, 
which symbolizes his moral changes. At the beginning, Kingsley 
repeatedly associates Tom with hiding and concealment. As a 
dirty chimney-sweep, his coating of black soot camouflages him 
in urban environments, much like Darwin’s insects. He throws 
stones at passing horses while ducking behind a wall (6). When 
he identifies a rich potential client on one such horse, Tom 
Will Abberley 26 
 
cunningly hides the missile he was about to throw (7). His 
master, Grimes, is similarly associated with deceit and 
concealment, examining clients’ grounds for poaching 
opportunities and hiding rabbits in his soot-bag. Kingsley 
associates this dishonesty with primitive animality. When Tom 
flees after being mistaken for a thief, the narrator 
associates his deviousness with wildness: “Now, Tom was a 
cunning little fellow--as cunning as an old Exmoor stag . . . 
He knew as well as a stag, that if he backed he might throw 
the hounds out” (28-29). As a water baby, Tom at first 
torments aquatic creatures with tricks, putting stones in 
their mouths. The narrator laments these actions, spurning the 
excuse that they are natural to boys, for “if they have 
naughty, low, mischievous tricks in their nature, as monkeys 
have, that is no reason why they should give way to those 
tricks like monkeys, who know no better” (72). Kingsley frames 
evolutionary regression as the embodiment of divine moral 
judgment, crystallized in the tale of the Doasyoulikes, who 
degenerate into apes though their parasitic laziness and 
egoism. The dishonest and selfish become trapped by their 
vices, unable to live without them, much as Bates’ insect 
mimicry protected weak, defenceless species which could only 
survive through masquerade.  
 Kingsley further emphasizes the moral symbolism of 
evolutionary laws (in his teleological reading of them) by 
personifying them in the matriarch Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid. This 
Will Abberley 27 
 
figure of Mother Nature punishes wrong-doers by reducing them 
to lower levels of animal existence. All sin will be reckoned 
with, she explains through her “machinery” of justice, echoing 
Paley’s image of nature as a vast machine (154). She 
particularly punishes dishonesty, caning schoolmasters for 
“telling lies” (158) and reducing Tom to an echinoderm after 
he secretly steals from her. Tom’s recovery from this 
degeneration only begins when he confesses his sin, as she 
explains: “I always forgive every one the moment they tell me 
the truth of their own accord” (172). Tom’s odyssey imports 
the Broad-Church notion of an immanent God directing history 
into biological evolution. Kingsley suggests that nature 
rewards honesty through the rise of civilization and punishes 
lies through humans degenerating into animality. This dynamic 
of dishonesty-as-degeneration is particularly pronounced in 
Kingsley’s depiction of the Irish. In 1860, he infamously 
described impoverished Irish people to his wife as “white 
chimpanzees” (Letters 2:107). His similarly animalistic 
portrayal of them in The Water-Babies associates such imagined 
primitiveness with mendacity. The narrator refers to Irish 
people as “gorillas” who “would not learn to be peaceable 
Christians” (146-47). Elsewhere, in a digression on rivers, 
the narrator imagines an Irish servant named Dennis who is 
incapable of answering questions without lying:  
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So you must not trust Dennis . . . but, instead of being 
angry with him, you must remember that he is a poor 
Paddy, and knows no better . . . [than to] tell you fibs 
. . . a hundred an hour; and wonder all the while why 
poor ould Ireland does not prosper like England and 
Scotland, and some other places, where folk have taken up 
a ridiculous fancy that honesty is the best policy (90-
91).  
 
Kingsley frames British colonization of Ireland as truthful 
civilization policing and improving mendacious primitives.   
Kingsley’s insistence on the unity of moral and factual 
truth in nature’s laws went hand-in-hand with insisting on the 
factuality (however qualified) of scripture. This claim 
defended his authority as moral interpreter of nature from the 
encroachments of scientific naturalists, who sought to read 
nature’s moral laws on a secular basis. Spencer had 
conceptualized ethics as a material evolution and suggested 
renaming morality “moral physiology” (58). He hence argued, 
rather optimistically, that the universal tendency towards 
truthfulness was shown in the growth of commerce, which relied 
on increasing trust (397). At the same time, much has been 
made of Kingsley’s correspondence with Huxley in the 1860s in 
which the men found common ground, in spite of their 
intellectual differences.
14
 Huxley’s statements during this 
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exchange sometimes seem to place him in strong agreement with 
Kingsley on the universe being a moral as well as physical 
order. In 1860, he wrote of his conviction “that the wicked 
does not flourish nor is the righteous punished . . . The 
gravitation of sin to sorrow is as certain as that of the 
earth to the sun.” Huxley also echoed Kingsley’s prioritizing 
of veracity, praising the parson’s “truthfulness and 
sincerity” and declaring: “One thing people shall not call me 
with justice and that is--a liar” (1:317-19). Yet these 
comments also illustrate how the rhetoric of natural morality 
could be secularized. While Kingsley imagined nature echoing 
Biblical morality, Huxley conceived of an agnostic ethics 
founded on natural laws alone. In 1868, he claimed nature 
offered humans an “education” in how to live, stating, “all 
artificial education ought to be an anticipation of natural 
education” (“Education” 3:85). Like the deists before them, 
Spencer and Huxley suggested that nature’s moral text might be 
read independently of revelation.  
Kingsley met this threat to his interpretive authority by 
presenting nature and the Bible as mutually dependent in their 
revelations. Each acted as a key to unlock the meaning of the 
other, he suggested. In this case, his argument was helped by 
the uncertainty of nature’s moral symbolism. In 1863, he wrote 
in a collection of Biblical sermons: “Those whom I have to 
teach want a living God, who cares for men, forgives men, 
saves men from their sins:--and him I have found in the Bible, 
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and nowhere else, save in the facts of life, which the Bible 
alone interprets”. Kingsley’s argument took advantage of the 
past disunity created by natural religion, warning that mere 
instinctive “religious sentiment,” which secularists sought to 
harness, was “apt (to judge from history) to develop itself 
into ugly forms . . . into polytheisms, idolatries, 
witchcrafts, Buddhist asceticisms, Phoenician Moloch-
sacrifices, Popish inquisitions, American spirit-rappings” 
(Gospel x-xi). Kingsley’s examples of religion gone wrong 
reveal the national, racial and religious hierarchy implicit 
in his natural theology. Liberal Anglicanism derives its 
interpretive authority, Kingsley implies, from its peculiarly 
British moderation, carefully balancing traditional belief 
with recognition of science’s discoveries. 
While scripture illuminated nature’s moral meanings, 
Kingsley suggested science illuminated the facts of scripture. 
The Bible did not conflict with evolution, he claimed, but was 
merely vague on such matters. “How God created,” he preached, 
“the Bible does not tell us. Whether he created . . . this 
world suddenly out of nothing, full grown and complete; or 
whether he created it . . . out of things which had been 
before it--that the Bible does not tell us. . . . It is not a 
book of natural science” (3). Having told Maurice in the same 
year of his hope that science and religion would “shake hands 
at last” (2:181), he presented science and scripture as 
shading into each other, along with factual and moral truth. 
Will Abberley 31 
 
The Bible began with Man and the Earth’s creation, Kingsley 
claimed, because their origins formed the first question of 
science: “And if man takes up with a wrong answer to that 
question, then the man himself is certain to go wrong in all 
manner of ways. For a lie can never do anything but harm, or 
breed anything but harm” (Gospel 2). Kingsley’s language 
blends scientific and moral truth, describing its opposite not 
as simply error but as “a lie.” Kingsley highlights the 
factual indefiniteness of scripture and the moral-symbolic 
indefiniteness of nature to suggest that the two only become 
fully intelligible when combined.  
Yet such efforts to align science and scripture as two 
parts of a single, moral-physical “truth” did not dispose of 
the more ominous, emerging notions that nature was amoral and 
morality was an artificial construct. After Kingsley’s death, 
Huxley would renounce his earlier claims for natural moral 
laws. Ethics, Huxley argued in 1893, emerged not through 
conformity but “combat” with the ruthless “cosmic process” 
(“Ethics” 9:81). As early as 1863, Huxley had written to 
Kingsley of his despair at “the impassable gulf between the 
anthropomorphism (however refined) of theology and the 
passionless impersonality of the unknown and unknowable which 
science shows everywhere underlying the thin veil of 
phenomena” (1:345). The material universe was, perhaps, not an 
anthropocentric text but a nexus of mindless, mechanistic 
processes. Conversely, Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871) argued 
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(to Kingsley’s regret) that moral sentiments had developed 
from the natural selection of groups over individuals.
16
 This 
view had the potential to relativize morals, since survival 
could depend on diverse impulses, such as the fratricide and 
infanticide witnessed among bees (1:73). By materializing 
morality, Darwin prevented it from standing outside of 
nature’s phenomena as a higher, governing law. Morality might 
be meaningful only within the artificial edifice of 
civilization. 
In his last years, Kingsley responded to these challenges 
by dividing the natural world into what he called “the How” 
and “the Why”, representing separate spheres of authority. Yet 
Kingsley’s rhetoric of division paradoxically maintained links 
between science and theology. In 1863, he had written to 
Darwin that, although their occupations were different, “Your 
work, nevertheless, helps mine at every turn. It is better 
that the division of labour should be complete, and that each 
man should do only one thing, while he looks on, as he finds 
time, at what others are doing, and so gets laws from other 
sciences which he can apply, as I do, to my own” (2:173). 
Kingsley’s politico-economic vocabulary (“division of labour”) 
presents science and natural theology as different points in a 
single process, pursuing the same unitary truth. By 1871, he 
had developed this division into “the How” and “the Why”, 
telling secular researchers: “you have no business with final 
causes, because final causes are moral causes, and you are 
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physical students only. We, the natural theologians, have 
business with them” (“Future” 329). By insisting nature had a 
“Why”, he preserved the textual model of natural laws 
signifying divine moral values. Simultaneously, by dividing 
the “moral” from the “physical”, he presented the former as 
proceeding from the latter instead of vice-versa. Beneath the 
material phenomena of science, he declared, lay “an invisible, 
vital, organizing force” which eluded reduction to mechanistic 
principles and could only be “the Breath of God”.  
Yet what morals did God’s “Breath” preach? In another 
lecture of 1871, Kingsley admitted: “Nature’s text at first 
sight . . . seems to say--not the righteous, but the strong 
shall inherit the land.” The world appeared ruled by “selfish 
competition, over-reaching tyranny, the temper which fawns and 
clings, and plays the parasite as long as it is down” (“Bio-
Geology” 175). Nonetheless, he demanded, “is this all which 
the facts mean?” The law of “mutual competition,” he claimed, 
was offset by “a law of mutual help” as every organism relied 
on others to feed and protect it, however unconsciously. 
Hence, “self-sacrifice, and not selfishness, is at the bottom 
the law of Nature . . . as it is the law of all religion and 
virtue worthy of the name” (175-77). Similarly as many 
Victorians assumed the Old Testament prefigured the New, 
Kingsley presents nature as symbolically prefiguring the 
morality that scripture would crystallize. His rhetoric of 
moral symbolism frames theology’s textual interpretation and 
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science’s empirical observation as complementary methods. 
While science reveals nature’s hieroglyphs, only the 
theologian can glimpse moral meanings in them.  
Kingsley recognized that such meanings were often unclear 
and questionable, like many textual interpretations. In 1870, 
he wrote to the geologist William Pengelly: “‘Life is 
certain,’ say I, because God is educating us thereby. But this 
process of education is so far above our sight, that it looks 
often uncertain and utterly lawless” (2:318). Yet, no matter 
how inscrutable nature seemed, Kingsley always persisted in 
his faith that higher, moral meanings lay behind it. His 
ability to maintain this faith consisted less in his 
vacillating circles of logic than his emotional attachment to 
a personal God as preoccupied with truthfulness as Kingsley 
was. It was his deeply held conviction that God could not lie 
which enabled Kingsley to look forward so optimistically to a 
future in which science and scripture would agree fully. Two 
years before Kingsley’s death, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote of 
truth and lies “in a Nonmoral Sense”; but Kingsley would have 
rejected this subject as a contradiction in terms. To concede 
the possibility of nonmoral knowledge would be to invalidate 
his authority as an interpreter of nature. His example 
illustrates suggestively how, in Victorian culture, the 
conflation and separation of factual and moral truth were 
bound up with institutional and disciplinary struggles for 
authority.  
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Notes 
The research for this article was enabled by an Early Career 
Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust. I thank Sally 
Shuttleworth, Rae Greiner and Lara Kriegel for their comments 
and advice. 
1. Muller and Meadows argued Kingsley mostly succeeded in 
reconciling science with his faith. Conversely, Hawley, and, 
more recently, Hamlin and Hale have stressed unresolved 
tensions. See also O’Gorman, Lightman (Popularizers 71-81), 
and Klaver, 351-64, 511-24. On the common and disputed grounds 
of Victorian science and religion, see Cannon, Turner, Brooke, 
Lightman, Levine, Buckland and DeWitt. 
2. DeWitt, 2-7. On the phrase “one culture,” see Levine. 
3. On Protestant ideals of sincerity, see Trilling; Kucich 
argues Victorian notions of “truth” and “lies” were often more 
slippery. 
4. Letter to George Brimley 2:44; see Buckland 182.  
5. On the history of this idea, see Donald 27-37 and Harrison 
13-15. 
6. See Topham 65-69; Brooke 168-73, 181-89. 
7. Blaisdell 164-74; see, for example, Kirby 2:48, 104. 
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8. Gates and Shteir argue the latter mode displaced the former 
in the 1850s (5-15). Lightman claims natural theology survived 
for longer, although in different forms (Popularizers 39-43). 
Smith suggests writers wavered between these modes (292-3). 
Fyfe (7) and Topham (60) argue “natural theology” was 
increasingly replaced by “theology of nature” which celebrated 
nature as God’s creation without relying on it as evidence of 
God. See Lorsch (20) on nature’s designification. 
9. See Bellon 954-55. 
10. See Daston and Galison 15-18; Levine Dying 27. 
11. Proverbs 25:2; see Blaisdell 167. 
12. See Hamlin “Aquarium” 81. 
13. See Turner 176-190; Barton 73-80. 
14. See Hamlin “Green” 269-71; Hale “Monkeys” 552-55. 
15. See Hawley 470; Klaver 477-83; Hale “Bulldog” 991. On 
Huxley’s moralization of nature, see DeWitt 36-37, and 
Lightman Agnosticism 131. 
16. On Kingsley's disagreement with Darwin, see Hale “Monkeys” 
587. On Darwinian moral relativism, see Dixon 175-76. 
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